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We study the implications of product and labor market imperfections for equilibrium 
unemployment under both  exogenous and endogenous capital intensity.  With  endogenous 
capital intensity, stronger labor market imperfections always increase equilibrium 
unemployment. The relationship between the long-run unemployment and the intensity of 
product market competition is not necessarily monotonic, but there is an elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor below one such that the long-run equilibrium 
unemployment is an increasing function of product market imperfections when the elasticity 
exceeds this threshold. Higher interest rates increase (decrease) the long-run equilibrium 
unemployment when the elasticity of substitution is below (above) one.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The employment consequences of long-term investments have for a long time 
been a controversial issue in economics and this issue seems to underlie many 
disputes between firm owners and labor unions. In conventional models of 
imperfectly competitive labor markets, for example Layard, Nickell and Jackmann 
(1991), the investments have no effect on equilibrium unemployment. This is due 
to the specification of a Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies a 
constant wage elasticity of labor demand. For this class of production functions, 
investments or interest rates will have no effect on the wage determination, 
achieved through wage negotiations due to the constant wage elasticity, and 
therefore no effect on equilibrium unemployment.  
Many reservations can be raised against the Cobb-Douglas specification, 
according to which the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is equal 
to one. For the U.S. economy empirical studies have produced estimates according 
to which the elasticity of substitution empirical studies lies well below one (see e.g. 
Lucas (1969), Chirinko (2002), Chirinko et.al (2004) and Antras (2004)).  Also 
empirical evidence concerning international data seems to consistently yield 
estimates, which do not lie in conformity with the Cobb-Douglas specification (see 
e.g. Rowthorn (1995), (1999), Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) and Pessoa et. al 
(2004)).  Berthold et. al (1999) have argued that the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor for Germany and France are higher than one. It has also 
been argued that when trying to explain variations in the labor share there is a need 
to depart from the usual assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function (see 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2002)). Moreover, and related, medium- to long-term 
changes in unemployment tend to be correlated with medium- to long-term changes 
in interest rates and thereby private investment  – a feature which seems to be 
inconsistent with predictions generated by models with Cobb-Douglas production 
functions (for some empirics, see e.g. Herbertsson and Zoega (2002)). On the 
theoretical side Phelps (2004) has argued, applying an intertemporal consumer 
market model, that higher real interest rates will raise the mark-ups in the product 
markets, leading to higher equilibrium unemployment. In the present paper we 
abandon the Cobb-Douglas specification and introduce a link between the long-
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term investment decisions and the negotiated wages by focusing on a more general 
class of CES production functions.  
We analyze the effects of simultaneous labor and product market imperfections 
on equilibrium unemployment under exogenous as well as endogenous capital 
intensity. Our study fulfils several purposes. Firstly, we explore the impact of long-
term investments on wage formation, and thereby on unemployment, in an 
economy characterized by labor and product market imperfections. Secondly, we 
investigate the consequences of imperfections in the product market on equilibrium 
unemployment. We design a theoretical model, which establishes important 
interaction effects between labor market imperfections, product market 
imperfections and long-term investments. We demonstrate how these effects have 
implications for equilibrium unemployment under exogenous capital intensity. 
Finally, we characterize the qualitative properties of equilibrium unemployment in 
the long run under endogenous capital intensity with a particular focus on the total 
long-run effects of interest rates and of labor and product market imperfections on 
equilibrium unemployment.  
Some employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed in the recent literature. However, in this 
literature the potential role of investments has been abstracted away by postulating 
a production function with labor as the only production factor either in a linear (see 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2003)) or Cobb-Douglas form 
(see Spector (2004)). Blanchard (1997) has developed a model of employment and 
capital accumulation, when firms are assumed to be monopolistically competitive 
in the product market. He assumes that each firm uses one unit of capital, which it 
combines with a variable amount of labor to produce output. Hence at the firm 
level the capital stock is not modeled and at the aggregate level it is simply equal to 
the number of firms through entry and exit decisions in the long run. Caballero and 
Hammour (1998) study the effects of match-specific, i.e. “appropriable”, 
investments and labor market institutions on both capital accumulation and 
unemployment, but they do not model product market imperfections.   
In what follows we extend the approach applied in these models by focusing 
on a general class of CES production functions within a framework where we 
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capture the product market imperfections through monopolistic competition and the 
labor markets imperfections through a ‘right-to-manage’ union bargaining model. 
In particular, we incorporate the general CES-type production function with capital 
and labor inputs in such a way that the elasticity of substitution between the 
production factors will depend on the capital-labor ratio.
1 
In the present analysis we initially show that intensified product market 
competition will decrease equilibrium unemployment under exogenous capital 
intensity. The effect of capital intensity on equilibrium unemployment turns out to 
depend on the specification of the production function.  Higher capital intensity will 
moderate the negotiated wage rate and thereby reduce equilibrium unemployment 
when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than one. 
However, higher capital intensity will have reverse effects when the elasticity of 
substitution is higher than one but smaller than the price elasticity of demand in the 
product market.  In particular,  the relationship between the capital stock and 
equilibrium unemployment would vanish in the special case of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Further, we determine the capital intensity consistent with a 
long-run equilibrium in the capital market. We find that the long-run equilibrium 
unemployment under endogenous capital intensity is an increasing (decreasing) 
function of the interest rate when the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor is lower (higher) than one. Finally, we characterize the qualitative properties 
of equilibrium unemployment in the long run with a particular focus on the total 
effects of labor and product market imperfections. These total long-run effects of 
labor and product market imperfections on equilibrium unemployment incorporate 
both direct effects and indirect mechanisms through the effects on wage formation 
and long-run capital investments.  We find that the long-run equilibrium 
unemployment under endogenous capital intensity is always an increasing function 
of the relative bargaining power of the labor unions, whereas there is, in general, 
not a monotonic relationship between the long-run unemployment and the intensity 
of product market competition. However, in this respect we find that there is critical 
threshold below one of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor such 
that the long-run equilibrium  unemployment is a decreasing function of the 
                                                 
1  Hoon (1998) has developed a model with a different focus to study the interactions of 
unemployment and economic growth by assuming that the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour is less than one under the efficiency wage hypothesis. 
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intensity of product market competition when the elasticity exceeds this threshold. 
Our new theoretical findings suggest important topics for future empirical research.  
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the model as 
well as the time sequence of decisions. Price setting and labor demand by firms are 
studied in section III. In section IV we analyze the wage determination through 
Nash bargaining subject to price setting and labor demand, while taking the capital 
intensity as given. Section V explores the determinants of equilibrium 
unemployment under exogenous capital intensity. In section VI we investigate the 
long-run investment decisions under labor and product market imperfections and 
characterize the determinants of the long-run equilibrium unemployment when 
capital intensity is endogenous.  Finally, in section VII we present concluding 
comments. 
 
II.   Basic Framework  
 
We focus on a model with product and labor market imperfections. In the long 
run, at  stage 1, firms commit themselves to their investment programs, which 
determine the capital stocks. The investment decisions are made in anticipation of 
their effects on wage setting, price setting and labor demand. At stage 2 there is 
wage negotiation between firms and labor unions and at this stage the firms are 
committed to their investments. The wage negotiations take place in anticipation of 
the consequences for labor demand and price setting. Finally, at stage 3 firms make 
employment decisions and set prices by taking the negotiated wage rate and 
investment decision as given.  
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent 
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   Stage  1    Stage  2    Stage  3 
            t i m e  
           
capital  stock   wage    labor  demand 
   decision   bargaining   price  setting 
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
This timing structure captures the idea of long-term investment decisions, 
which are inflexible at the stage when the wage negotiations are undertaken. Such a 
timing structure seems plausible when the investments represent, for example, 
irreversible technology choices. Of course, the relative timing between the 
negotiated wage setting and the investment decisions could also be reversed so as 
to capture that the negotiated outcome is a long-term contract relative to the 
investment decision (see e.g. Anderson and Devereux (1991) or Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004), chapter 9). In a recent study Hellwig (2004) has extensively 
compared a number of key properties associated with these two alternative timing 
structures within the framework of a general equilibrium model. He suggests that 
although the long-term labor demand – with endogenous investment – is more 
elastic than the short-term demand, it does not necessarily lead to a less aggressive 
wage policy if the reactions of “temporary-equilibrium prices”, in particular the 
reactions of real interests, anticipate the wage policies.   
We postulate (for each firm  ) a CES production function with constant returns 
to scale according to 
i
1 1 1












i i i i i aL K a L K R ,  i = 1,…,n    ( 1 a )  
where   denotes firm i’s capital stock,   is the amount of labor, and   and σ are 
parameters satisfying 0 < a < 1 and σ > 0, respectively. The parameter a is often 
called the distribution parameter (see e.g. Arrow at al (1961)), while σ captures the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This production function lies in 
conformity with empirics and opens up a rich and interesting relationship between 
the capital stock and equilibrium unemployment in the short or medium run as well 
i K i L a
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as in the long run, i.e. no matter whether the capital stock is exogenous or 
endogenous.  For reasons of comparison we also repeatedly consider the 




i i i i L K L K R
− =
1 ) , ( ,   i = 1,…,n      ( 1 b )  
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is equal to one. Notice 
that in (1b) the parameter a defines the labor share of production. 
 
 III.  Price Setting and Labor Demand 
The product market is modeled to operate with monopolistic competition a la´ 






















i D n U
s ,         (2) 
where   denotes the elasticity of substitution between products and where n is the 
number of products (and firms).  We take this elasticity of substitution as the 
measure of the degree of product market competition.
s
2 A higher elasticity of 
substitution means a higher degree of product market competition. In particular, the 
limiting case of perfect competition is associated with the elasticity of substitution 
 approaching infinity.   s
A firm   decides on price and employment so as to maximize the following 
profit function 
i
{ i i i i i i i
L p
L w L K R p
i i
− = ) , ( max
,
π   .       ( 3 )  
                                                 
2  Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have analyzed the case where in the long-run there is free entry of 
firms so that s is endogenous in that respect. The utility function (2) has the special feature that an 
increase in the number of products does not increase utility directly (for more discussion in this 
respect, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), p. 882). In our framework the number of firms is 
assumed to be fixed, but, in contrast to Blanchard and Giavazzi, capital intensity is endogenously 
determined in the long-run. 
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At this stage the firm takes the negotiated wage rate   and the capital stock   as 
given. From the underlying utility function, given by (2), the demand in the product 
market can be seen to be of the form  














 = ,                         (4) 



















 is the index of the aggregate 
price level, M  is the aggregate nominal income and   is the elasticity of 
substitution between different products.
1 > s
3 Thus, M/P denotes the real income. 
Furthermore, if we assume that the rents from capital are competed away in the 
long run, the aggregate nominal income is 
[ ] B u w u N M + − = ) 1 ( ,         ( 5 )  
where N denotes the number of workers, all unionized, in the economy, u is the 
unemployment rate, w is the negotiated wage rate and B is the unemployment 
compensation. It is important to point out that at this stage of the game the 
aggregate nominal income M  is exogenous, but later on both the wage rate   and 
the unemployment rate   are endogenized. 
w
u
We can rewrite the CES production function (1a) as 




















L  .       ( 6 )  
By imposing market-clearing in the product markets,  i i R D = , and by using (6) we 
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 (7) 
where   and   are taken as given.   i K P M , , i w
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By imposing the symmetry condition  P pi =  for all i (9) can be simplified 
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σ µ a s w K a M p i i i    for all i,          (10a) 
where the mark-up factor,  ) 1 /( ) ( − = s s s µ , associated with the pricing equilibrium, 
depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution between products.  
From  (10a) and using the definition of the aggregate nominal income, M in (5), 
we can attach the following qualitative properties to the price setting: 





























     (11) 
In the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function (1b) we can use a similar 





















=  for  all  i                  (10b) 
As one can see, the qualitative properties of (10b) are similar to those of (10a). 
                                                                                                                                               
3  A formal standard proof is available upon request. 
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We can now summarize our characterization of the optimal price setting by 
firms in 
Proposition 1 Higher wage rates, higher unemployment compensations or lower 
elasticities of substitution between products will raise the equilibrium price in the 
product market, whereas higher unemployment rates or higher capital stocks will 
decrease it, ceteris paribus. 
The pass-through effects - characterized in Proposition 1 - seem to appeal to 
intuition and several of these features are well known from the literature. An 
important new aspect in Proposition 1 is the role of the capital stock for the price 
setting. An increase in the capital stock will increase production and thereby induce 
lower prices.
4 This feature has not been captured in the earlier wage bargaining 
literature under imperfectly competitive product markets (see Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2003) and Spector (2004)).  
In order to simplify notation we from now on mostly abstract from the firm-
specific index associated with product i  Doing so the necessary first-order 
condition determining labor demand can be written as  
.
0 = − = w pRL L π          ( 1 2 )  
with the associated second-order condition  . 0 < + = L L LL LL R p pR π  Using the CES 
production function (1a) the first-order condition (12) can be expressed as 
p
w















































K L                   (13a) 
with   and   In the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
(1b) we end up with the labor demand  
0 > K L . 0 ) / ( < p w L
                                                 
4  This provides an alternative argument for the result by Phelps (1994), according to which lower 
interest rates will decrease the pricing mark-ups.  
















1 σ                         (13b) 
with  and   as well. In the labor demand functions (13a) and (13b) 
the product price is endogenous as it depends on the wage rate.  
0 > K L 0 ) / ( < p w L
The wage elasticity of labor demand, which turns out to be important later on, 






































w              (14a) 
while the Cobb-Douglas production function leads to 
() s s a L
w L
s w





= σ η  ,            (14b) 
where   From (14a) we can conclude that the wage elasticity of 
labor demand depends on the following four factors: the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor (
. ) ( / ) 1 (
1 − = − s s s µ
σ ), the degree of competition in the product markets 
( ), the capital-labor ratio ( s L K k / ≡ ) and the distribution parameter    We 
observe that intensified product market competition, measured by higher elasticity 
of substitution between the products, increases the wage elasticity of labor demand, 
i.e. 
. a
. 0 > s η  More intense product market competition makes it harder for the firms 
to survive with higher wages and thus increased competition makes the firms’ 
employment decisions more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. This feature 
holds true also in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function (see equation 
(14b)).
5  When we approach a situation with perfect competition in the product 
                                                 
5 There is empirical evidence according to which product market regulation has decreased and 
thereby competition increased in OECD countries during the 1990s (for evidence, see Nicoletti, 
Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago and Swaim (2001)). Gersbach (2000) summarizes three 
mechanisms (lower mark-ups, higher total factor productivity and expanded sets of product 
varieties), through which reductions in product market imperfections might enhance employment. 
Blanchard and Philippon (2004) have constructed a model to explore the effects of intensified 
product market competition when labor unions learn slowly about structural changes in the 
economic environment and when trust plays an important role in the labor market.  
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1 ( > σ
Next we ask, what is the effect of the capital-labor ratio k  on the wage 
elasticity of labor demand? This is an important question as this wage elasticity 
plays an important role when evaluating the relationship between the negotiated 
wage and the capital stock. It is also an interesting issue because, for example, the 
competitiveness of the capital markets and thereby the size of the capital stock will 
affect the capital intensity   Differentiating (14a) with respect to   yields  . k k
2 1





















k        ( 1 5 )  
where   From (15) we infer the following properties: (i) Under gross 
complementarity between capital and labor 
. 1 > s
) 1 ( < σ  higher capital intensity 
increases the wage elasticity of labor demand. (ii) The same happens under gross 
substitutability  ) as long as the elasticity of substitution between products 
( ) is lower than the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the 
production function. (iii) Under gross substitutability (
s
) 1 > σ  the wage elasticity is 
a decreasing function of the capital intensity if the elasticity of substitution between 
products ( ) is higher than the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor  s
σ in the production function. 
Case (iii) seems to be more plausible than case (ii) because empirical estimates 
of σ  are never far above one, whereas available estimates of mark-ups imply that 
 is significantly higher. In fact, empirical evidence suggests roughly that the 
mark-ups lie in the range between 1.1 and 1.5 (see e.g. Roeger (1995) and Martins, 
Scarpetta and Pilat (1996)). Mark-ups in this range would be consistent with an 
assumption that   In what follows we will therefore assume that 
s
. 3 ≥ s . σ > s  
With an exogenous capital intensity and for  σ > s  we can summarize our 
findings in  
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Proposition 2  Intensified product market competition will increase the wage 
elasticity of labor demand. Higher capital intensity will increase (decrease) the 
wage elasticity of labor demand when the elasticity of substitution between labor 
and capital is smaller (larger) than one.  
From Proposition 2 we can conclude that the technological elasticity of 
substitution between the production factors is of primary importance for the 
relationship between capital intensity and the wage elasticity of labor demand. 
According to Proposition 2, when capital and labor are ‘gross complements’ 
) 1 ( < σ , higher capital intensity will increase the wage elasticity of labor demand 
due to the fact that higher capital intensity will raise the labor share. Under ‘gross 
substitutability’  ) 1 ( > σ  between capital and labor the reverse happens, i.e. higher 
capital intensity will decrease the wage elasticity of labor demand due to the fact 
that higher capital intensity now will decrease the labor share (see also Koskela and 
Schöb (2002), where it is demonstrated how the capital cost with endogenous 
capital intensity affects the wage elasticity of labor demand when  1 ≠ σ ).    
Finally, (14b) reveals the following result in the Cobb-Douglas case 
 Corollary 1: The wage elasticity of labor demand is independent of the capital 
intensity in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Corollary 1 verifies the conventional assumption, whereby there is no 
relationship between wage elasticity and investment under circumstances with 
Cobb-Douglas production functions due to the fact that the labor share is 
independent of capital intensity. Thus, this type of production function eliminates 
the potential channel through which credit market behavior might impact on the 
wage elasticity via the determination of the capital stock.  
 
IV.   Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining  
We now turn to look at the stage of wage determination and we continue to 
consider the capital stock K  as given. We apply the Nash bargaining solution 
within the context of the ‘right-to-manage’ approach according to which 
employment is unilaterally determined by the firms. The wage bargaining takes 
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place in anticipation of optimal price and employment decisions by the firms. 
Following the Nash bargaining approach the firm and the labor union negotiate 
with respect to the wage so as to solve the optimization problem    
{ [] [
β β −
− − = Ω
1 * * * ) , ( ) ( max wL L K pR b w L
w ]     (16) 
 subject to   0 = L π  and  0 = p π ,  
where the relative bargaining power of the union is β  and that of the firm is 
) 1 ( β − ,  ,   is the (exogenous) outside option available to union 
members and 




L wL − = , ( ) π . The outside options for the firm and the union 
are   and U , respectively, where  K ∆ −
o =
o π = Mb M  is the number of labor union 
members and  r + = ∆ 1  denotes the cost of capital. Under these assumptions the 
necessary first-order condition for the wage determination can be written as 
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L w .                                    (18b) 
Substituting the expressions (18a) and (18b) into the first-order condition (17) 
yields, after some rearrangement, the following Nash bargaining solutions for the 
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σ                 (19b) 
According to (19a) and (19b) the negotiated wage rate depends positively on the 
outside option ( ) and on the relative bargaining power of the union ( b β ), while 
negatively on the wage elasticity of labor demand (η). According to (19a), the 
negotiated wage is affected by the capital-labor ratio ( ) both directly and 
indirectly though its impact on the wage elasticity of labor demand in a way, which 
is determined by whether elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is 
smaller or larger than one. Furthermore, the wage elasticity of labor demand 
depends positively on product market competition ( )  and for that reason 
decreased product market imperfections moderate the negotiated wage.  In 
particular, as we approach perfect product market competition with   in the 




[] [ b a a ) 1 /( 1 / ) 1 ( 1 ] b − + − + = η β β , where  ) a 1 /( 1 − = η is the wage elasticity of 
labor demand under perfect product market competition. 
By differentiating the wage rate (19a) with respect to the capital-labor ratio we 
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The relationship (20) characterizes the capital stock as a strategic commitment 
device, whereby the capital stock may serve as a mechanism inducing wage 
moderation. The technological features summarized by the elasticity of substitution 
between the production factors determine whether such wage moderation actually 
takes place or not. The intuition for this relationship can be understood as follows: 
First, when  1 < σ  higher capital intensity decreases the negotiated wage rate via 
two channels: (1) it becomes harder for the union to extract rent in negotiations 
because of the induced higher wage elasticity of labor demand, and (2) a higher 
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 when  1 < σ  and thus moderates wage formation. As (20) makes 
clear, increased capital intensity will induce higher wages under  1 > σ . The 








We now summarize our analysis of the wage determination in 
Proposition 3 The negotiated wage rate depends negatively on the wage elasticity 
of labor demand and therefore intensified product market competition will 
decrease the wage rate. Higher capital intensity will decrease (increase) the 
negotiated wage rate if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 
smaller (larger) than one.  
Finally, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas we can replicate the 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) finding according to which the capital stock 
does not affect wage formation. 
Corollary 2 With a Cobb-Douglas production function capital intensity will have 
no effect on the negotiated wage. 
The negotiated Nash wage (19a) and (19b) imply a number of interesting 
special cases. If all the bargaining power lies with the union ( = β ), the Nash 



















σ ,    (20’) 
according to which the wage mark-up depends negatively on the wage elasticity of  
labor demand, which is a function of the capital-labor ratio   when  k  while it 
is not when  1 = σ . Further, the wage elasticity of labor demand is an increasing 
function of the price elasticity of product demand   In the opposite case with all 
the bargaining power concentrated to the firm (
. s
0 = β ), the relationship between 
the negotiated wage and the capital intensity disappears. In this case the negotiated 
wage converges to the competitive wage with  , i.e. the wage mark-up is 
eroded. Intuitively this seems to make sense for the following reason. The capital 
intensity serves as a strategic commitment device, which will affect the distribution 
b w
C =
  16 
of the rents, achieved through bargaining, in imperfectly competitive labor 
markets.
6 Once the labor market imperfections are eroded the capital intensity can 
no longer play such a strategic role.  
There is empirical evidence according to which higher product market 
competition will moderate wage formation. Nickell (1999) presents a survey of this 
literature, which includes, for example, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) (Canadian 
data), Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) (British manufacturing data) and 
Neven, Röller and Zhang (1999) (data from eight European airline companies) to 
analyze links between product market competition and union power.  
 
V.   Product  Markets,  Exogenous Capital Intensity and 
Equilibrium Unemployment 
Above we have characterized wage formation, labor demand and price setting 
from a partial equilibrium perspective. We now move on to explore the 
determinants of equilibrium unemployment in a general equilibrium framework. In 
this section we are interested in the relationships between the exogenous capital 
intensity, the intensity of competition in the product market and the equilibrium 
unemployment.  
According to (19a) and (19b) the negotiated wage rate in industry   is of the 
form  , where the mark-up factors in the cases of CES and Cobb-Douglas 
production functions are 
i



































σ   .                 (21b) 
                                                 
6  In other contexts both the capital structure and the compensation scheme have been shown to 
constitute a similar type of commitment device (see e.g. Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) and 
Koskela and Stenbacka (2004a), (2004b)). 
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These mark-up factors are, in principle, industry-specific. We impose symmetry 
assumptions meaning that  A Ai =  and  for all i. In a general equilibrium 
the term   should be re-interpreted as the relevant outside option, which we 
specify as 
N N
i w w =
b
uB w u b
N + − = ) 1 ( ,          ( 2 2 )  
where   is the unemployment rate,  u B  captures the unemployment benefit and   
denotes the negotiated wage rate in all identical industries (see, e.g. Nickell and 
Layard (1999)). Assuming a constant benefit replacement ratio 
N w
N w B q =  and 
substituting (22) for   into the Nash bargaining solutions (19a) and (19b) yields 














,          ( 2 3 )  
where the wage mark-up A is given by (21a) for  1 ≠ σ  and by (21b) for  . 1 = σ  
According to (23) a higher benefit-replacement ratio,  , and a higher mark-up 
in the wage determination,  , will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further, 
from the mark-ups in the wage determination we can conclude that higher wage 
elasticity of labor demand will decrease equilibrium unemployment. In fact, 






























s ,       (24) 
meaning that intensified product market competition will moderate the wage mark-
up in the general case  1 ≠ σ . The same qualitative result holds true also in the case 
with  1 = σ  as can be seen by differentiating (21b) with respect to    Hence, 
intensified product market competition will, ceteris paribus, decrease equilibrium 
unemployment because 
. s
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As for the impact of the capital-labor ratio on equilibrium unemployment we 





















































































(25) offers a characterization of the capital stock as a strategic commitment device 








, we can explore 
the effect of the capital intensity on equilibrium unemployment by combining (20) 
and (25). The relationship between the negotiated wage and the capital intensity 
was characterized in Proposition 3. According to Proposition 3 more intense 
product market competition will, ceteris paribus, moderate the negotiated wages 
and thereby decrease equilibrium unemployment, while the relationship between 
capital intensity, wage formation and thereby the relationship between capital 
intensity and equilibrium unemployment is more complicated. More specifically, it 
depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution between production factors, on 
the degree of product market competition, measured by the price elasticity of 
demand as well as on the relative sizes of these two parameters.  
Our findings concerning the determinants of equilibrium unemployment under 
exogenous capital intensity can now be summarized in  
Proposition 4 Increased product market competition will reduce equilibrium 
unemployment. Higher capital intensity will reduce equilibrium unemployment 
when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is smaller than one 
while the reverse happens when it is higher than one.  
According to Proposition 4 the effect of capital intensity on equilibrium 
unemployment depends on whether the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital exceeds or falls short of one. In any case, as the empirical studies cited in 
the introduction unanimously seem to reject the Cobb-Douglas specification, 
Proposition 4 predicts that there is a systematic relationship between equilibrium 
unemployment and capital intensity. As the existing empirical studies cited in the 
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introduction all report estimates according to which the elasticity of substitution is 
below one for the U.S. economy our model would imply the prediction of a 
negative relationship between equilibrium unemployment and the capital intensity 
for this economy.  
Finally, if we were to accept the Cobb-Douglas production function our model 
would reproduce the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) finding according to 
which the capital stock does not affect wage formation.  
Corollary 3 With a Cobb-Douglas production function equilibrium 
unemployment is independent of the capital intensity.  
Our results regarding the relationship between labor market imperfections, 
product market imperfections, investments and equilibrium unemployment are 
related to a few recent research contributions. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and 
Spector (2004) have earlier theoretically studied the employment consequences of 
product market competition and deregulation within a bargaining framework. Ebell 
and Haefke (2003) apply a dynamic matching model to explore the dynamic 
relationship between product market competition and equilibrium unemployment. 
In contrast to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004), Ebell and Haefke 
(2003) make use of a Cournot model where the number of firms competing in each 
industry measures the intensity of product market competition. All these 
contributions, however, abstract from the determination of capital investment and, 
in particular, from its potential implications for employment by assuming either the 
linear or Cobb-Douglas production function with labor being the only production 
factor.  As our study makes clear, the characterization of equilibrium 
unemployment is bound to be incomplete under such restrictions of the models. As 
we have shown,  the interactions between labor market imperfections, product 
market imperfections and the capital intensity have important implications for the 
wage formation, and thereby for equilibrium unemployment. 
VI.  Endogenous Capital Intensity and Equilibrium 
Unemployment: The Long-Run Perspective  
 
So far we have restricted ourselves to a short run or medium run perspective, 
where the capital stock has been considered exogenous. In this section we now turn 
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to explore the initial stage of the decision making structure. At this stage firms 
determine the capital investments and thereby the intensity  .  We are 
particularly interested in characterizing how the interest rate and labor and product 
market imperfections impact on the capital investments and on the associated 
equilibrium unemployment in the long run.  
L K k / =
We impose no imperfections on the capital market. Thus, in the long run the 
capital intensity is determined so as to generate zero profits. However, the firms 
have rational expectations regarding the subsequent outcomes with respect to wage 
negotiation, employment and price setting and the long-run investment decisions 
internalize the effects of the capital intensity on wages, employment and prices.  
The long-run capital stock is determined by the equilibrium condition 
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The constraints capture that the capital stock is set in anticipation of the subsequent 
determination of wages, employment and prices. In (26)  r + = ∆ 1  denotes the cost 
of capital, which we assume to be exogenously given.  
Substituting the labor demand, determined by (12), into the profit function in 
the left hand side of (26) and dropping the firm-specific index we can write the 
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 for the CES production function (1) we see that the profit 
function associated with (26) can be rewritten as 
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π . By further dividing all the terms by 
* L  it 
follows that the equilibrium condition (26) can be expressed in terms of the 
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(28) defines the equilibrium capital intensity as a function of effective cost of 
capital ( ), and via the Nash bargaining wage   in (19a), as a function of the 






β ) so that we have   By differentiation of (28) we find 
that  
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Hence, the equilibrium capital intensity is a decreasing function of the effective 
costs of capital and the intensity of product market competition, whereas it is an 
increasing function of relative bargaining power of trade union. These comparative 
statics properties can be shown to hold also in the case of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with  1 = σ  (1b).                
We summarize our findings regarding the equilibrium capital intensity in  
Proposition 5 The equilibrium capital intensity depends negatively on the degree 
of product market competition and on the effective costs of capital, whereas it 
depends positively on the bargaining power of the trade union.  
The negative relationship in (29) between the equilibrium capital intensity and 
the degree of product market competition captures the idea that increased product 
market competition simply diminishes the available returns associated with the 
investment. This relationship seems to be consistent with the empirical evidence 
presented by Alesina et al (2003). These authors used OECD data to study how 
various measures of regulation in the product market, concerning in particular entry 
barriers, are related to investment behavior. According to their findings product 
market deregulation seems to have a statistically significant negative effect on 
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investment behavior, ceteris paribus. It should, however, be remarked that the 
analysis of Alesina et al (2003) abstracts from labor market frictions. The positive 
relationship in (29) between the labor market imperfections and the equilibrium 
investment captures the intuition that increased bargaining power of the labor union 
decreases the relative attractiveness of labor as a production factor. Therefore, the 
optimal response of the firm is to increase the capital investment.  
We next characterize the equilibrium unemployment in the long run with 
endogenous capital intensity. We are particularly interested in exploring the effects 
of the degree of product market competition, the bargaining power of the trade 
unions and the interest rate on equilibrium unemployment. For that purpose we 
essentially have to study the effects of these parameters on the wage mark-up. 
The negotiated wage mark-up associated with the equilibrium capital intensity 
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Now we study the long-run effects of the interest rate as well as product and 
labor market imperfections on the wage mark-up under endogenous capital 
intensity.
 7 We first explore the impact of the interest rate on the wage mark-up. By 
differentiating (30) we can see that the effect of a change of the effective cost of 
capital is given by  , where   is characterized in (25). Clearly, in the long 
run this effect is now opposite in sign compared with (25) due to the property that 
 Hence, a lower effective cost of capital, associated, for example, with more 
intense credit market competition as a result of financial market reforms, reduces 
equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital is smaller than one, while the reverse happens when it is higher than one.  
*




* < ∆ k
We can formulate this feature in  
 
Proposition 6 The long-run equilibrium unemployment under endogenous capital 
intensity is an increasing (decreasing) function of the interest rate when the 
                                                 
7 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003, p. 893) call for a similar extension in a related context. 
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elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower (higher) than one, while 
the interest rate has no effect on equilibrium unemployment in the case of a Cobb-
Douglas production function.    
Earlier we showed that intensified product market competition will reduce 
equilibrium unemployment when the capital intensity is exogenously given. We 
next ask the following question: What is the long-run effect of intensified product 
market competition, when this affects the mark-up and thereby equilibrium 
unemployment both directly via the wage elasticity of labor demand and indirectly 
by changing the wage rate and thereby the capital intensity, which in turn affects the 
mark-up both directly and through the wage elasticity of labor demand?  













































s s k s
s .                                   (31) 
 
where  As delineated in (31), we can identify three channels whereby 
the intensity of product market competition affects the long-run mark-up: (1) a 
direct effect via the change in the wage elasticity of labor demand (
). , (
* s k η η =
) s βη −
)
*
* s k k βη
 (cf. 
(24)), (2) an indirect effect via the wage elasticity of labor demand ( due 
to a change in capital intensity and (3) an indirect effect via the change in the 












− − ). The direct effect is always negative, because  0 > s η , 
while the two indirect effects may be negative or positive depending on the size of 
σ . We know from (29) that k  is always negative, while from (15) we see that 
*
s * k η  
is negative provided that  1 ≥ σ . It follows that the first indirect effect is always 
negative when  1 ≥ σ . As for the remaining indirect effect we can observe that it is 
always negative when  1 ≥ σ . Therefore, when 1 ≥ σ , each of the three effects drive 
                                                 
8 We can see that this is reduced to (24) in the absence of the investment effects.  
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in the same direction and intensified product market competition unambiguously 
decreases the negotiated wage mark-up in the labor market and thereby reduces 
equilibrium unemployment under endogenous capital intensity. Notice that this 
long-run impact of product market competition on equilibrium unemployment also 
holds true in the special case of Cobb-Douglas production function. 
When the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is less than one 
( ), intensified product market competition does not necessarily result in a 
decrease in the negotiated wage mark-up in the labor market. In this situation only 
the direct effect is negative, while the indirect effects tend to increase the negotiated 
wage mark-up, because k  is always negative, while 
*
s * k η  is positive when  1 < σ . 
Whether the two indirect effects outweigh the direct effect depends on the 
parameters of the model. Extensive numerical experiments with different parameter 
values indicate that there is a critical value  [ ] 1 , 0  such that   (A ) 
whenever 
0 s < A 0 ≥ s
 ( ).  
1 < σ
ˆ ∈ σ
σ σ ˆ > σ σ ˆ ≤
We collect our results to the following proposition. 
Proposition 7  There is a critical threshold value  1 ˆ < σ  such that the long-run 
equilibrium unemployment is a decreasing function of the intensity of product 
market competition when  .  σ σ ˆ >
Proposition 7 indicates that if the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital is less than one, the consequences of tighter product market competition for 
the wage mark-up and unemployment are not clear. It is of particular interest to 
characterize those circumstances under which intensified product market 
competition induces higher wage markups and, thus, a higher unemployment rate. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the critical value σ ˆ  depends on the bargaining power of 
the labor union, β . Notice that the critical value tends to be very low when the 
bargaining power is close to zero, while it rises rather sharply when β  increases 
from zero. This observation is quite natural, because a stronger labor union is able 
to push wages up, while it is harder for the firms to off-set these pressures with 
higher capital-labor ratios, i.e. to replace labor with capital, when σ  is sufficiently 
low. A sufficiently small σ  serves as a technological obstacle against substituting 
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labor with capital. When this technological obstacle is strong (σ  low) and when the 
bargaining power of the union undermines the investment incentives of the firm the 
total effect of intensified product market competition may increase the wage-mark 
up and thereby harm employment. 
 Interestingly, the critical value σ ˆ  is not necessarily a monotonic function of 
β . When the bargaining power approaches one, eventually the critical value   
may start to decrease. This phenomenon indicates that the effectiveness of the 
capital-labor ratio as an instrument of the firm to prevent wages from rising 
becomes efficient when the labor union becomes very strong. Thus with very strong 
labor market imperfections (β  sufficiently close to one), a lower elasticity of 
substitution is required for increased product market competition to result in higher 
wage mark-ups and higher unemployment rates. 




















Figure 2: Critical σ  above (below) which intensified  product  market   
competition decreases (increases) the wage mark-up for the parameter 
combination with s = 10, ∆ = 1.03, and a = 0.5. 
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Figure 3 further illustrates how the critical value σ ˆ  shifts when the distribution 
parameter a changes. In general, the larger is a (the labor share of production), the 
smaller is the region where   is positive. s A
9 This observation means that intensified 
product market competition is a stronger device for inducing wage moderation 
when the labor plays a more significant role relative to capital as a production 
factor.   






















Figure 3: The effect of the parameter a for the critical σ  above (below) which 
intensified product market competition decreases (increases) the wage mark-up 
for the parameter combination with s = 10 and ∆ = 1.03. 
Finally, we explore the long-run effect of the bargaining power of the labor 
union on equilibrium unemployment under endogenous capital intensity. Now, 
differentiating (30) with respect to β  yields, after some rearrangements, 
                                                 
9 We were able to verify this same pattern with a series of numerical experiments with alternative 
parameter values. 
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Again there are three channels of influence whereby the parameter β  affects the 











, (2) an indirect effect through the shift in the wage elasticity of labor 
demand produced by a change in the capital intensity (  and (3) an 






















 A priori, we would expect that more 
imperfect labor markets yield higher wage mark-ups also in the long run, which 
would imply a higher rate of equilibrium unemployment. In fact, as is shown in 
Appendix A, this turns out to be the case, but it is not a self-evident result from a 
technical point of view as the direction of the indirect effects is opposite to the 
direct effect when σ .  
  We can formulate 
 
Proposition 8 The long-run equilibrium unemployment under endogenous capital 
intensity is always an increasing function of the relative bargaining power of the 
labor unions. 
 
Thus, we have established the following general result. Even though increased 
bargaining power of the labor union will stimulate the investment incentives of 
firms in the long run, the induced increase in the equilibrium capital stock will not 
be large enough from the point of view of the total employment effects so as to 
outweigh the negative direct employment effects of higher negotiated wages. This 
suggests that the expansion of the capital stock induced by increased labor market 
imperfections can never be large enough so as to promote employment in the long 
run.  
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VII. Conclusions 
The employment consequences of intensified competition and deregulation in 
product markets have been analyzed to some extent in the recent literature. 
However, in this literature the potential role of investments has been neglected as 
these studies have postulating a production function with labor as the only 
production factor either in a linear (see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and 
Haefke (2003)) or in a Cobb-Douglas form (see Spector (2004)). Our starting point 
has been similar to these studies in that we have assumed imperfect competition in 
the product and labor markets, but importantly we have generalized these models 
by assuming a more general and realistic CES-type production function, in which 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor can be different from one. 
This has established a new and richer framework for studying the interaction 
effects between imperfections in labor and product markets and long-term 
investment decisions for the determination of equilibrium unemployment in the 
long run.  
We have shown the following new results. Under exogenous capital intensity – 
which can be interpreted to offer either a short-run or a medium-rum perspective 
for structural unemployment analysis – reduced product market imperfections, 
ceteris paribus, will always decrease equilibrium unemployment. The effect of 
capital intensity is more complex.  The capital intensity serves as a strategic 
commitment device with which the owners of the firms can affect the distribution 
of rents achieved through wage bargaining in imperfectly competitive labor 
markets. In fact, the negotiated wage rate decreases, and therefore also equilibrium 
unemployment declines, as a result of higher capital intensity when the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor is less than one, while the reverse happens 
when the elasticity of substitution is higher than one. This is due to the fact that in 
the former (latter) case higher capital intensity will increase (decreases) wage 
elasticity of labor demand. In the special case with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function the relationship between capital stock and equilibrium unemployment will 
vanish. When the negotiated wage converges to the competitive rate the capital 
intensity does no longer serve as a strategic commitment device, which could affect 
the distribution of the rents. Thus, in the absence of labor market imperfections the 
capital intensity can have no effect on equilibrium unemployment.   
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After demonstrating how labor and product market imperfections affect the 
equilibrium capital intensity in the long-run, we investigated the determinants of 
equilibrium unemployment from the long-run perspective. Higher interest rates will 
increase (decrease) equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor is lower (higher) than one. Furthermore, we explored the 
qualitative properties of equilibrium unemployment in the long run with a 
particular focus on the total long-run effects of labor and product market 
imperfections on equilibrium unemployment. These total long-run effects of labor 
and product market imperfections on equilibrium unemployment incorporate both 
direct effects and indirect mechanisms through the effects on wage formation and 
long-run capital investments. We have shown that the long-run equilibrium is 
always an increasing function of the relative bargaining power of the labor unions, 
whereas there is, in general, not a monotonic relationship between the long-run 
unemployment and the intensity of product market competition. There is, however, 
a critical threshold, below one, of the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor such that the long-run equilibrium unemployment is a decreasing function of 
the intensity of product market competition when the elasticity exceeds this 
threshold.  
Our model can clearly be extended in several dimensions. Throughout the 
analysis we have focused on a homogeneous labor force. However, it could be very 
interesting to separate the labor force into a high-skill and low-skill segment with 
different elasticities of labor demand due to the fact that elasticity of substitution 
between capital and skilled labor will likely differ from the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and unskilled labor.
10 Within such a richer context it might be 
possible to characterize qualitatively different interaction patterns between and 
capital investments and employment across the different labor market segments. 
Also, our model has abstracted from all aspects of taxation of production factors.   
Our new theoretical findings also raise interesting empirical issues for future 
research. In particular, our analysis highlights the importance of obtaining reliable 
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital inputs, 
                                                 
10 Goldin and Katz (1998) have analyzed the origins of technology-skill complementarity both 
theoretically and empirically. Krusell et.al (2000) have provided a theoretical framework to 
explain the skill premium in terms of relative wage of skilled and unskilled labor.   
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because, as we have emphasized throughout this analysis, several significant 
properties of the long-run equilibrium unemployment are contingent on this 
elasticity. Moreover, the relationship between long-run equilibrium unemployment 
and product market competition depends on other parameters as well, which is an 
important topic for empirical research.   
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Appendix A: Derivation of wage elasticity of labor demand 
By using the production function we can write the wage elasticity of labor demand 
as follows 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 8 
We have to prove that  given by (32) satisfies that . We separate the proof 
into two separate parts, one for 
β A 0 ≥ β A
1 ≥ σ  and one for  1 < σ . 
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(1)  1 ≥ σ : The sign of (32) is determined by the numerator, which consists of three 










, (b) the indirect effect through the shift in 
the wage elasticity of labor demand produced by a change in the capital intensity 


























−  The direct effect is always positive. Recalling 
from (29) that   is always positive, it follows that both the indirect effects are also 
positive whenever σ , because then it holds that  * k η >0 . 
(2)  1 < σ : In this case it is not straightforward to see that the condition   
holds, because when 
0 ≥ β A
1 < σ  we have  0 < k η  and 1 0 < −σ  so that both of the 
indirect effects in (32) are negative. For the result   to hold, the (positive) 
direct effect must exceed the (negative) indirect effects in (32). In order to show 
that this indeed holds true we present a proof by contradiction. 
0 ≥ β A

































































































However, since   the antithesis would imply that  . But, this would 







σ . Consequently, it must hold true that  whenever  0 ≥ β A
1 < σ .          Q.E.D. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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